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Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The
Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions
Geoffrey R. Stonet
Governmental restrictions of expression may be divided into
two general categories-content-neutral restrictions and contentbased restrictions.' Content-neutral restrictions restrict communication without regard to the message conveyed. Laws prohibiting
noisy speeches near a hospital, banning the erection of any billboards in residential communities, or requiring disclosure of the
names of leafleteers are examples. In judging the constitutionality
of such restrictions, the Supreme Court engages in a balancing of
first amendment interests against competing government concerns. 2 Content-based restrictions, on the other hand, restrict communication because of the message conveyed. Laws prohibiting
the publication of specific types of "confidential" information, forbidding the hiring of teachers who advocate the violent overthrow
of the government, or banning the display of the3 swastika in certain
neighborhoods illustrate this type of restriction.
t Associate Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. The author would like to thank
Paul Bator, Gerhard Casper, Charles DiSalvo, Walter Hellerstein, William Hodes, Douglas
Laycock, and Robert Vollen for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
Compare, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) with Police Dep't v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). See also FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436
U.S. 775, 800-01 (1978); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975). For a
somewhat more comprehensive discussion of this distinction, see L. TRiBE, AMERICAN CONSTiTUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-2 to -3 (1978). See also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 382
(1968); Ely, Flag Desecration:A Case Study in the Roles of Categorizationand Balancing in
First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482, 1496-502 (1975); Williams, Subjectivity,
Expression and Privacy:Problems of Aesthetic Regulation, 62 MINN. L. Rav. 1, 24-28 (1977).
2 See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104 (1972); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
For an analysis of the sorts of variables deemed relevant and the way in which the Court
attempts to define the nature and operation of this balancing process, see L. TRIBE, supra
note 1, § 12-20.
3 The most obvious and most common form of content-based restriction consists of
government action-legislative, executive or judicial-that on its face expressly accords differential treatment to the expression of certain specified messages, ideas, or information.
Familiar examples are laws banning obscenity, see, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973), laws prohibiting the advocacy of violent overthrow of government, see, e.g., Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), laws forbidding the display of "For Sale" signs in front
of houses, see, e.g., Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977),
and laws or injunctions prohibiting the disclosure or publication of certain specified sorts of
information, see, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
A second form of content-based restriction involves government action that appears on
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In its interpretation of the first amendment, the Supreme Court
has been especially wary of government action that restricts speech
because of its content.4 The Court has, to be sure, permitted
content-based restrictions when the speech at issue has fallen within
one of those special and limited categories of expression, such as
obscenity, false statements of fact, or fighting words, that the Court
has found to be of such low value in terms of the historical, philosophical, and political purposes of the amendment as to be entitled
to less than full constitutional protection. 5 Outside this "low value"
realm, however, the Court has embraced a stringently speechprotective set of standards, sustaining content-based restrictions of
"fully protected" expression in only the most extraordinary circumstances.'
its face to be content-neutral, but that is directed at a harm caused by the content of the
speech. See Ely, supra note 1, at 1496-502; Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under
the First Amendment, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 29, 53-54 (1973). For examples of this sort of

content-based restriction, see Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (striking
down school's prohibition on wearing black armbands); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315
(1951) (upholding disorderly conduct conviction because of crowd's reaction to speaker's
controversial statement). This sort of law must be viewed as content-based because the
restriction is triggered by the content of the communication. Such laws thus seem to pose a
threat to the values underlying the first amendment similar to that posed by the more
common form of content-based restriction.
Finally, a content-based restriction arguably exists when a law that is content-neutral
on its face can be shown to have been motivated by governmental hostility towards speech
of a certain content. On the question of improper motivation generally, see L. TRME, supra
note 1, §§ 12-5 to -6; Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP.CT. REV.95; Ely, Legislativeand Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). Further aspects of the contentbased/content-neutral distinction are discussed in the text at notes 97-125 infra.
4 See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 95 (1972). See also City of Madison, Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1976).
3 The "two-level" theory of speech originated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942). See Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. Rnv. 1. From
the 1940s to the mid-1960s, the Court viewed "low value" speech as wholly unprotected by
the first amendment. More recently, however, the Court has tended to treat "low value"
speech in a more speech-protective manner. Although not abandoning the "two-level" theory
entirely, the Court's more flexible approach has at least reduced its importance. Compare,
e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) with Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250 (1952) with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) with Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). See
generally L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 12-17; Karst, Equality as a Central Principleof the First
Amendment, 43 U. CI. L. REv. 20, 30-34 (1975). The Court's analysis of the obscenity issue
has not as yet followed this pattern. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
The Court has not articulated a single, all-embracing standard, but rather it has
employed several different standards and approaches, including categorization, clear and
present danger, and variations of the compelling-interest test. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n
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One sequence of cases does not conform to this description of
the Court's treatment of content-based restrictions of "fully protected" speech. Although presenting widely varying fact patterns,
these cases have each involved a content-based restriction defined
in terms of expression about an entire subject, rather than in terms
of a particular viewpoint, idea, or item of information. That is, the
restrictions in these cases accorded disfavored treatment to "fully
protected" speech because the speech related to such general subject matters as public affairs, sex, or partisan politics.7 The question
posed by these cases is whether the stringent standards of review
employed by the Court to test content-based restrictions generally
should be used to test these sorts of content-based restrictions as
well.
This question is not an easy one, for although "subject-matter"
distinctions unquestionably regulate content, they at least appear
to do so in a viewpoint-neutral manner." As a consequence, such
restrictions do not fit neatly within the Court's general framework
for reviewing laws regulating speech; it is unclear whether they
should be treated as content-based, content-neutral, or something
altogether different. Not surprisingly, then, the Court has encountered considerable difficulty in attempting to make sense of these
cases. Not only has the Court's reasoning lacked analytical clarity
and consistency, but the results reached in individual cases often
seem questionable and the implications for first amendment docv. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). In the past quarter-century,
the Court has actually upheld such restrictions in only a handful of decisions. Interestingly,
almost all of these decisions have appeared in the past ten years. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy,
417 U.S. 733 (1974). See also FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S.Ct. 3026 (1978); Zaccihini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners'
Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977). I have not included in this list the "subject-matter" cases
that are the focus of this article. In the period before the last quarter-century, decisions
upholding content-based restrictions were somewhat less rare. See, e.g., Feiner v. New York,
340 U.S. 315 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
7 I am concerned in this article with only those cases in which "fully protected" speech
is disadvantaged because of its subject matter. A subject-matter classification according
disadvantageous treatment to "less than fully protected" speech poses a different problem,
for the inquiry in such cases centers on the "value" of the speech restricted. That appears
not to be the central inquiry in the subject-matter cases examined in this article. This is not
to say, however, that my analysis of these cases has no implications for the Court's two-level
theory.
I Subject-matter distinctions are not the only content-based restrictions that appear to
be viewpoint-neutral. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S.Ct. 3026 (1978) (broadcast
restrictions on use of obscene, indecent, or profane language); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971) (restriction on offensive language). Much of what is said in this article about
subject-matter restrictions is applicable to other viewpoint-neutral restrictions as well.
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trine highly disquieting. This article explores the Court's handling
of this question and then offers an analysis designed to place the
question in a more manageable context. It is hoped that this analysis will help solve the subject-matter puzzle and at the same time
shed some light on first amendment doctrine generally.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT AND SUBJECT-MATTER RESTRICTIONS:

DECISIONS IN SEARCH OF DOCTRINES

A.

The Problem

In Rowan v. United States Post Office Department,9 one of the
Court's first encounters with a subject-matter distinction,'0 the
Court considered the constitutionality of a federal statute designed
to enable householders to prevent the delivery of unwanted mail.
The statute directed the Postmaster General, upon request of a
householder, to issue an order directing the offending sender to refrain from any further mailings to that householder. There can be
little doubt that such legislation promotes a legitimate and substantial interest and would, if drafted in a content-neutral manner,
withstand ordinary content-neutral scrutiny.' 1 The statute at issue
in Rowan, however, was not content-neutral. Rather, it was directed
at only those mailings that were "offensive because of their lewd and
salacious character"' 12 and could be brought into play only if the
householder found the initial mailing to be "erotically arousing or
sexually provocative."' 3 On its face, then, the statute permitted
speech to be restricted only if it related to sex; speech relating to
other subjects such as politics or religion, even if equally offensive,
1 397

U.S. 728 (1970).
10Although Rowan was not the first case to pose the subject-matter problem, the Court
in most earlier cases found it unnecessary to address this issue, for it was able to hold the
legislation invalid on other grounds. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965)
(disturbing-the-peace statute held unconstitutionally vague); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516 (1945) (requirement to register before soliciting union memberships invalid as prior restraint). In at least two pre-Rowan cases, the Court upheld legislation creating subject-matter
classifications without addressing the subject-matter question. See Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
Similarly, in two recent cases involving subject-matter classifications, the Court in each case
held the legislation at issue unconstitutional on other grounds. See First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); City of Madison, Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976). In these cases, the Court seems to have focused
primarily on the "discrimination against types of speakers" issue rather than on the content
issue as such.
" See Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 233, 262-66.
See also Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. at 736-38.
,2397 US. at 731.
,139 U.S.C. § 3008(a) (1976).
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was simply outside the scope of the statutory scheme. 4 The natural
question for the Court should have been whether the statute in
Rowan was permissible given the stringent standards ordinarily
applied to content-based restrictions. Had the statute been limited
in application only to antiwar or antiblack mailings, it would almost
surely have triggered the most rigorous standards of first amendment scrutiny. In Rowan, however, the Court upheld the statute
without even mentioning this issue. The Court simply ignored the
subject-matter distinction, treating the statute as if it were in fact
content-neutral. 5
This treatment is all the more striking in light of the Court's
concern about this issue in a different aspect of the case. Throughout its opinion, the Court emphasized that the statute granted the
householder complete and unreviewable authority to decide for himself whether a mailing was "erotically arousing or sexually provocative." This grant of individual discretion was "essential," the Court
observed, in order "to avoid possible constitutional questions that
might arise from vesting the power to make any discretionary evaluation of the material in a governmental official."' 6 Thus, although
the unequivocal governmental decision to accord disfavored treatment to speech relating to sex passed unnoticed, the Court evinced
real concern over the possibility that the government might treat
some sexually-related speech differently from other sexually-related
speech. The Court did not explain why one form of content-based
restriction should be treated any differently. from the other. 7
" The statute at issue in Rowan is in fact only a quasi-subject-matter restriction, for
although it limits speech only if it relates to sex, it does not restrict all speech on that subject.
Despite this duality, the Rowan statute nevertheless possesses the most important characteristics of subject-matter restrictions.

5 It is of course possible that Rowan was premised upon an unstated assumption that

nonobscene, sexually offensive speech is entitled to less than "full" first amendment protection. The Court has since rejected this classification of such speech, however. See Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 73 n.1 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 84-

87 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
" 397 U.S. at 757.
'7 One final wrinkle clouds Rowan still further. If the householder has absolute discretion
to decide whether a mailing is "erotically arousing or sexually provocative," then he can, as
the Court itself recognized, prohibit the delivery of even "a dry goods catalogue because he
object to the contents." 397 U.S. at 737, See also id. at 741 (Brennan, J., concurring). The

subject-matter distinction, in other words, exists in form only. In operation, the statute may
well be content-neutral. The Court might thus have seen the subject-matter distinction as
wholly unimportant. This is, however, too simple. A householder seeking to use the statute
to ban the delivery of offensive but nonsexually related speech would have to lie, since, to
bring the statute into play he would have to inform the Postmaster General that the mailing
was "erotically arousing or sexually provocative." Even though he could not be held legally
accountable for this dishonesty, the very need for such deceit would unquestionably deter
such use of the statute. In short, the statute will likely have a differential impact, leaving
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The Court's failure to examine closely the statute in Rowan
contrasts sharply with its direct focus on the subject-matter issue
two years later in Police Department v. Mosley. 8Mosley concerned
the constitutionality of a Chicago ordinance making it unlawful for
any person to picket or demonstrate on a public way within 150 feet
of a school building while the school was in session. The ordinance
was not content-neutral, however, for it expressly exempted
"peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute" from
its otherwise absolute prohibition. As the Court recognized, the ordinance embodied a clear subject-matter distinction: "Peaceful
picketing on the subject of a school's labor-management dispute is
permitted, but all other peaceful picketing is prohibited."' 9 Indeed,
the Court found that "[t]he central problem with Chicago's ordinance is that it describes permissible picketing in terms of its subject matter. ' 20 Such restrictions are presumptively invalid, the
Court declared, for "above all else" the first amendment is directed
against government efforts "to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."' 2' In effect,
then, the Court in Mosley proceeded on the assumption that
subject-matter restrictions are to be treated no differently from
other sorts of content-based restrictions.
Chicago had defended its ordinance as necessary to prevent
disruption of school activities. Although conceding that cities may
have a substantial interest in prohibiting picketing that disrupts a
the subject-matter issue in Rowan unresolved.
It should also be noted that the Rowan statute involved two content-based restrictions
in addition to the one discussed in the text. First, the householder will himself make contentbased decisions in deciding which mailing to ban, and the government, through the statutory
scheme, will enforce these content-based decisions. Governmental enforcement of private
"censorship," although ordinarily prohibited, might be permissible here because in this situation the householder's privacy interest can be protected without interfering with the mailer's
ability to communicate with willing recipients. See Stone, supra note 11, at 262-66. Second,
the Rowan statute could be brought into play only if the initial mailing was an advertisement
that offered for sale matter the householder found to be "erotically arousing or sexually
provocative." The Court itself paid no attention to the statute's focus on advertisements.
Even though "commercial speech" was still "unprotected" at the time of this decision, the
result in Rowan could not have been predicated upon that doctrine. This is so for two reasons:
(1) the commercial speech involved consisted of advertisements for matters that were themselves protected by the first amendment, cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) (not all forms of commercial speech are unprotected), (2) the statute looked to content
to classify advertisements for miatter protected by the first amendment. Even in 1970, a law
restricting advertisements for antiwar books, for example, would not have been viewed as
falling within the "commercial speech" doctrine.
IN408 U.S. 92 (1972).
10Id. at 95.
2Id.
2!

Id. See also id. at 98, 99.
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school, the Court noted that "Chicago itself has determined that
peaceful labor picketing during school hours is not an undue interference with school, 2 2 and that "however the term 'peaceful' is
defined," peaceful nonlabor picketing "is obviously no more disruptive than 'peaceful' labor picketing. 2 3 Chicago had argued further,
however, that the subject-matter classification was justified because "as a class, nonlabor picketing is more prone to produce violence than labor picketing. 2 4 But the Court was again unpersuaded,
emphasizing that "[p]redictions about imminent disruption from
picketing involve judgments appropriately made on an individualized basis, not by means of broad classifications, especially those
based on subject matter. 2 5 Whatever excesses may arise out of
nonlabor picketing can, as with labor picketing, "'be controlled by
narrowly drawn statutes,' . . . focusing on the abuses and dealing
even-handedly with picketing regardless of subject matter. 26 The
Court thus held the ordinance invalid "because it makes an impermissible distinction between labor picketing and other peaceful
' 27
picketing.
It seems evident that, tested against the Mosley standards, the
statute upheld in Rowan could not pass constitutional muster. Although sexually-related mail is arguably more likely to be more
offensive to more householders than nonsexually-related mail, judgments about the offensiveness of the materials, at least according
to Mosley, should not be made "by means of broad classifications,
especially those based on subject matter."2 8 If the government
22 Id.

at 100.

= Id.
24 Id.

Id. at 100-01.
"

Id. at 102.

2

Id. at 94. It should be noted that the Court in Mosley employed an important but

previously little-used doctrine. Ordinarily, in testing the constitutionality of content-based
restrictions, the Court focuses primarily on whether the restricted speech is sufficiently harmful to important state interests to warrant the restriction. In Mosley, however, the Court
emphasized the difference in treatment between labor and nonlabor speech and focused on
whether the distinction itself was justified. The Court looked not to the harmfulness of the
nonlabor speech as such, but to the relative harmfulness of labor and nonlabor speech. The

issue, in other words, was cast in equal protection as well as first amendment terms. This
supplemental equal protection analysis is of special utility in examining underinclusive
content-based restrictions, such as those in which the government adopts a content-based
restriction in lieu of a broader, content-neutral restriction. An obvious example of such a
restriction, in addition to the statutes in Rowan and Mosley, would be a law prohibiting
Democrats from using loudspeakers at night in residential neighborhoods. The Mosley doctrine asks not whether there is adequate reason to restrict the speech restricted, but whether

there is adequate reason to restrict only the speech restricted. A negative answer to the second
question eliminates the need even to ask the first.
21408 U.S. at 100-01.
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wished to protect the householder, it should have done so in such a
way as to deal "even-handedly" with all potentially offensive mail
"regardless of subject matter." Mosley and Rowan thus seem fundamentally at odds in their treatment of subject-matter distinctions.
B. Treatment of Subject-Matter Restrictions after Mosley
Over the next five years, the Court confronted subject-matter
restrictions in varying forms and contexts. Following the pattern set
in Rowanand Mosley, the Court in the ensuing decisions- failed to
recognize the relationship between the cases or the special problem
posed by subject-matter restrictions.
1. CBS v. Democratic National Committee. In the term following Mosley, CBS v. DemocraticNational Committee2 posed the
question whether radio and television broadcasters could, with FCC
approval, constitutionally refuse to sell advertising time to groups
or individuals seeking to express their views on controversial issues
of public importance. The case raised two basic issues. First, by
analogy to traditional public forum analysis, which guarantees an
individual the right to use various sorts of government-owned property for speech purposes, is there a "public forum" right of the
individual to use the "public" airwaves for purposes of expression?
The public forum doctrine is in essence a species of content-neutral
analysis, and its contours are thus defined through a form of balancing. 0 Second, even if there is no public forum right as such, is the
challenged policy, given the willingness of broadcasters routinely to
sell airtime for commercial advertising, an impermissible regulation
of content? The court of appeals, in a controversial decision, directed its attention primarily to the second issue. Although stating
that subject-matter distinctions, such as the commercial/publicissue distinction involved in CBS, were "somewhat less 'odious'
than . . . discrimination[s] among different controversial view-

points on particular issues," the court nevertheless held the challenged policy invalid as an unconstitutional "discrimination among
' 31
speakers. . . based on what they intend to say."
The Supreme Court reversed. In so doing, however, the Court
412 U.S. 94 (1973).
See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at § 12-21; Kalven, The Concept of the Public
Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 1; Stone, supra note 11.
3' Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 660, 661 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), rev'd sub nom., CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). CBS also
raised the question whether the challenged policy constituted government action that would
trigger the demands of the first amendment. The Court as a whole did not decide this
question.
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paid scant attention to the subject-matter issue. Rather, Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the Court, focused primarily on the public
forum issue, explaining at some length that to require broadcasters
to air public-issue advertising would intrude upon their journalistic discretion, endanger effective operation of the fairness doctrine,
create serious administrative problems, and result in greater governmental supervision of broadcasters. 32 Only at the very end of
his opinion did Chief Justice Burger take note of the subjectmatter issue. Mosley provided "little guidance" in CBS, 3 Chief
Justice Burger argued, because the fairness doctrine independently
required broadcasters to provide full and fair coverage of public
issues. Accordingly, the only real difference in treatment between
commercial and public-issue speech was that with respect to the
latter, broadcasters, rather than advertisers, would "determine
what issues are to be discussed by whom, and when. 3 4 This difference, he concluded, did not amount to" 'discrimination' against"
35
public issue speech.
The Chief Justice's analysis of the subject-matter issue is unsatisfying at best. The operation of the fairness doctrine may lessen
the differential impact of the challenged policy, but it surely does
not eliminate it. As Justice Brennan demonstrated in dissent, the
power to "determine what issues are to be discussed by whom, and
when" is of no small import,3 and Chief Justice Burger's conclusion
that "there is no 'discrimination' against controversial speech" in
CBS seems simply to blink reality.3 7 The real explanation for the
decision, I submit, was the Court's lack of concern with the particular content-based restriction at issue. It is inconceivable that the
Court would find "no discrimination" if broadcasters, with FCC
approval, routinely sold airtime to all commercial and public-issue
advertisers except Socialists, whose views were presented instead
through a form of fairness doctrine under the journalistic control of
broadcasters. Even in the context of broadcasting,"s the Court would
412 U.S. at 123-27.
Id. at 129.
' Id. at 130.
35Id.
3 See id. at 184-96 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
n Id. at 130.
As recognized in CBS, the Court has long taken the position that "the broadcast media
pose unique and special problems not present in the traditional free speech case." 412 U.S.
at 101. See also FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 3039-41 (1978); FCC v. National
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 798-99 (1978); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-90 (1969). Although this doctrine played a role in the Court's evaluation of the "public forum" issue in CBS, Chief Justice Burger did not expressly rely upon it

in his analysis of the subject-matter issue.
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undoubtedly demand at the very least a compelling justification for
the content-based restriction. The Court's failure in CBS even to
examine the justifications, if any, for the differential treatment of
commercial and public-issue speech suggests that it found the distinction between these two types of speech less threatening from the
standpoint of the policies underlying the first amendment than the
distinction in the hypothetical case. Regrettably, the Court made no
serious effort to explain or to justify this reaction, or to reconcile it
with Mosley's"9 assimilation of subject-matter restrictions to other
content-based restrictions.
2. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights. Mosley fared no better
when the Court again confronted the commercial/public issue distinction a year later in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights.40 In
Lehman, a sharply divided Court upheld the constitutionality of the
city's policy permitting the interior advertising spaces of its transit
vehicles to be leased for the display of commercial but not publicissue or political messages. Lehman, like CBS, posed both the
content-neutral public forum and the content-based subject-matter
issues. Unfortunately, Justice Blackmun, speaking in a plurality
opinion for four members of the Court, blurred these two issues.
With respect to the subject-matter issue, however, Justice Blackmun made it clear that the distinction between commercial and
public-issue speech would be permissible so long as it was not
"arbitrary, capricious, or invidious."4 Pointing to the city's interests in protecting a "captive audience" from potentially offensive
public-issue advertisements and avoiding the "sticky administrative problems" that might arise if such advertisements were accepted for display, Justice Blackmun concluded that the challenged
policy easily satisfied this standard.
The standard adopted by Justice Blackmun is a far cry from
the stringent standards ordinarily employed by the Court to test
content-based restrictions and applied in Mosley to a restriction
similarly linked to subject matter. 2 Justice Blackmun offered two
basic arguments that may be viewed as explanations for his use of
this extraordinarily lenient standard of review. First, he emphasized
that in its operation of the transit system and its sale of advertising
3 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan found the policy invalid on public forum
grounds. He thus referred to the subject-matter issue only briefly, relying specifically on
Mosley as controlling authority. See 412 U.S. at 200-01 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" 418 U.S. 298 (1974). For a more extensive analysis of Lehman, see Stone, supra note

11.

418 U.S. at 303.
42

See note 6 supra.

1978]

Subject-Matter Restrictions of Speech

space "the city is engaged in commerce. 4 3 The Court has long recognized, however, that whatever significance the proprietary/
governmental distinction may have for other purposes, it is ordinarily irrelevant to the standards imposed under the Constifution.11
Indeed, less than a year after Lehman, the Court, in an opinion
written by Justice Blackmun, implicitly rejected the notion that the
proprietary character of government action alters the appropriate
standards of first amendment analysis. 5 Moreover, it seems doubtful at best that Justice Blackmun would apply his "arbitrary, capricious, or invidious" standard if the city, acting in its proprietary
capacity, had chosen instead specifically to exclude Communist,
sexist or antiwar messages from its vehicles." I therefore suspect
that Justice Blackmun was moved in Lehman less by any concern
that "the city is engaged in commerce" than, like Chief Justice
Burger in CBS, by the special nature of the content-based restriction involved.
This suspicion is confirmed by Justice Blackmun's second asserted justification for his lenient standard of review. Justice Blackmun emphasized that "the city has decided that '[p]urveyors of
goods and services saleable in commerce may purchase advertising
space on an equal basis, whether they be house builders or butchers.' -4 The point seems to be that since all those seeking to purchase advertising space for commercial purposes are treated alike,
and all those seeking to purchase space for public issue or political
purposes are treated alike, the content problem virtually disappears. The same argument, however, could be made with respect to
any content-based restrictions, for any such restriction treats all
those subject to its provisions equally, as it does those not subject
to its provisions. In analyzing such restrictions, the Court ordinarily
focuses not only on whether all those within the classes defined by
the state are treated equally, but also on whether the content classification itself is permissible. Thus, Justice Blackmun's observation
418 U.S. at 303.
See, e.g., City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 191-92 (1923); City of St.
Petersburg v. Alsup, 238 F.2d 830, 831-32 (5th Cir. 1956); Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp.
1004, 1008 (S.D.W. Va. 1948). But see Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
See also Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
" Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). See Karst, supra note
5, at 35.
41 But cf. Buck v. Impeach Nixon Comm., 498 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1974) (transit authority
enjoined from denying advertising space to impeachment posters).
'7 418 U.S. at 303-04 (quoting Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 34 Ohio St. 2d 143,
146, 296 N.E.2d 683, 685 (1973)).
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makes sense as a justification of the use of a particularly lenient
standard of review only if it is premised upon the assumption that
the commercial/public-issue classification at issue in Lehman is in
some fujdamental sense different and less disturbing than most
other content-based distinctions. Yet, like Chief Justice Burger in
CBS, Justice Blackmun made no effort to explain this assumption
or to square it with Mosley.
Justice Douglas, who cast the crucial fifth and deciding vote in
Lehman, concurred with Justice Blackmun's disposition of the case,
but reached this result for his own, quite distinct, reasons. Unlike
Justice Blackmun, Justice Douglas concluded that the display of
any advertisement, regardless of content, in a publicly-owned vehicle would violate the constitutional rights of "captive" commuters.
On this view of the case, the subject-matter issue falls by the wayside, for the Constitution clearly does not require a state that has
engaged in one unconstitutional act to adopt another simply for the
sake of equality." As if to highlight his disagreement with Justice
Blackmun, however, Justice Douglas went out of his way to note
that he did "not view the content of the message as relevant either
to petitioner's right to express it or to the commuters' right to be
free from it."" Thus, Justice Douglas seemed clearly, if unnecessarily, to indicate a preference for the Mosley approach to subjectmatter distinctions.
Justice Brennan, speaking for the four dissenters in Lehman,
maintained that when "the discrimination is among entire classes
of ideas, rather than among points of view within a particular
class," it does not become "any less odious." 0 According to Justice
Brennan, since commercial advertisements frequently carry implicit "political" messages, the city's policy opened the door to sub
rosa discrimination among differing viewpoints on political issues.51
Thus, building upon Mosley, but ignoring CBS, Justice Brennan
declared that the subject-matter restriction in Lehman should properly be tested against the stringent standards of review used to test
content-based restrictions generally. Applying those standards, Justice Brennan concluded that "the city's selective exclusion of political advertising constitutes an invidious discrimination on the basis
of subject matter, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments."5 2
0 But cf. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (sex discrimination in hiring prison
guards justified because of inhumane and unconstitutional conditions in the prison).
"418 U.S. at 308 (Douglas, J., concurring).
" Id.
at 316 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"' See id. at 317-18.
62 Id.
at 319-20.
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3. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville. In Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville,5 3 decided in 1975, the Court considered the constitutionality of a subject-matter restriction that, as in Rowan, limited
expression because of its concern with sex. The Court held invalid
an ordinance prohibiting a drive-in movie theater from displaying
any film containing nudity if the theater's screen was visible from
a public street or place. In defense of this ordinance, the city had
argued that it was entitled to protect its citizens against unwilling
exposure to offensive expression, and that films containing nudity
were likely to be "especially offensive to passersby."" The Court
rejected this argument, emphasizing that "when the government
.undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of
speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others, the
First Amendment strictly limits its power." 5 Applying a strict standard of justification, the Court concluded that "the limited privacy
interest of persons on the public streets cannot justify this censorship of otherwise protected speech on the basis of its content."58 The
state interest, in other words, was not of sufficient importance to
justify a content-based restriction. The Court distinguished Rowan
and Lehman-the only prior decisions upholding content-based restrictions on a captive audience rationale-on the ground that the
degree and nature of the captivity were more serious in those cases
than in Erznoznik. Although most likely a persuasive distinction at
the factual level, this response to Rowan and Lehman is hardly
satisfactory from the standpoint of doctrine. For there can be no
doubt that, in testing the constitutionality of the subject-matter
distinctions, the Court embraced a stricter standard in Erznoznik
than in either of the earlier cases.
Erznoznik's disharmony with Rowan and the plurality opinion
in Lehman becomes even clearer upon considering the Court's treatment of the city's further argument that the ordinance was justified
because the display of nudity on a drive-in movie screen would
distract motorists and cause accidents. Echoing Mosley, the Court
indicated that the standards used to test classifications based on
"the subject matter of expression" should be no different from those
used to test content-based restrictions generally. 57 Focusing on the
content distinction itself rather than on the strength of the state
interest, the Court dismissed the city's argument out-of-hand. The
422 U.S. 205 (1975).
, Id. at 208.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 212.
, See id. at 215.
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ordinance, given the asserted purpose, was "strikingly underinclusive."8 "There is no reason to think," the Court explained, "that a
wide variety of other scenes in the customary screen diet. . . would
be any less distracting to the passing motorist."5 9 Had the Court
employed a similar underinclusiveness analysis in Rowan and
Lehman, as well as in CBS, it would almost surely have held the
restrictions challenged there invalid. Thus, while lending force to
Mosley's approach to subject-matter restrictions, Erznoznik at the
same time obscured the issue further. 0
4. Greer v. Spock. It was in this context that, in the term
following Erznoznik, the Court decided Greer v. Spock, 1 which involved a subject-matter restriction directed specifically at partisan
political speech. The Court had, even before Greer, several opportunities to consider similar sorts of restrictions. In United States
Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter
Carriers,2 and its companion case, Broadrick v. Oklahoma,3 the
Court, shortly after its 1973 decision in CBS, considered the constitutionality of federal and state statutes that, among other things,
prohibited public employees from expressing their views "on public
affairs, personalities and matters of public interest" if the expression is directed "toward party success." 4 Without examining the
nature of the restriction in depth, the Court declined in these cases
to invalidate such legislation on grounds of overbreadth. The Court
reasoned that since the restrictions "are not aimed at particular
parties, groups, or points of view, but apply equally to all partisan
activities of the type described, 0' 5 they should be subjected "to a
less exacting . . . scrutiny."66 Similarly, in its 1976 decision in
Buckley v. Valeo, 6 which involved the validity of various aspects of
the Federal Elections Campaign Act, the Court observed that "the
Act does not focus on the ideas expressed by persons or groups
subject to its regulations." 6 Because of this viewpoint neutrality,
Id. at 214.
5, Id. at 214-15.

"The dissenters, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and White, made only
passing reference to the subject-matter issue. See e.g., 422 U.S. at 223 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
,' 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
413 U.S. 548 (1973).
413 U.S. 601 (1973).
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947), quoted in United States
Civil Serv. Comm. v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 556 (1973).
United States Civil Serv. Comm. v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564.
"Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. at 616.
5 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Id. at 17. See also id. at 39. The Act involved a subject-matter distinction, however,
because it regulated various constitutionally protected activities, such as the making of
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the Court treated the restriction as if it were content neutral." As
in Letter Carriers and Broadrick, it simply ignored the subjectmatter distinction.
Greer concerned the asserted right of political candidates to
enter ordinarily unrestricted areas of the Fort Dix Military Reservation in order to distribute literature and discuss their campaigns
with soldiers stationed at the base. Although the base routinely
permitted civilian speakers to address military personnel on sub'
it prohibjects ranging from business management to drug abuse,70
ited by regulation any speech or demonstration of a partisan political nature. The candidates challenged this regulation as an impermissible restriction on access to a public forum and, also, as an
impermissible restriction on content. After rejecting the public
forum claim,71 Justice Stewart, speaking for the Court, turned his
attention-briefly-to the content issue. Emphasizing that "there
is no claim that the military authorities discriminated in any way
among candidates for public office based upon the candidates' supposed political views," '7 2 and that the ban on partisan political

speech "is wholly consistent with the American constitutional
tradition of a politically neutral military,

73

Justice Stewart con-

cluded that the regulation was not an unconstitutional restriction
on the basis of content.
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Stewart seems to have embraced the view that when government regulates expression on its
own property in a nonpublic forum context, it should be granted a
freer hand to draw lines according to content than it would have in
other circumstances.7 4 Although this principle lacks clear roots in
prior first amendment jurisprudence, Justice Stewart made no effort to explain or to defend it.7 5 More important for our purposes,
financial contributions for "speech" purposes, only in the context of partisan political
"speech."
See id. at 16-19; 60-84.
7 In addition, visiting clergymen were occasionally invited to participate in religious
services at the base chapel, and various theatrical and musical productions were presented
on the base. See 424 U.S. at 831.
71 Justice Stewart's analysis of the public forum issue focused almost exclusively on
whether the property had traditionally been considered a public forum, rather then on
whether the prohibited speech would be incompatible with the normal function of the property. It thus seems at variance with developing public forum principles. See The Supreme
Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARv. L. REV. 56, 152-59 (1976). See generally Stone, supra note 11.
424 U.S. at 838-39.
7 Id. at 839.
" See id. at 838 n.10.
One glaring difficulty with this approach is that it requires the Court to determine at
what point government's decision to allow speech of some content on its property converts a
"
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he did not make clear whether this principle is applicable to all
content-based restrictions or, rather, whether it is applicable only
when, as in Greer, the restriction is defined in a viewpoint-neutral
manner in terms of subject matter. Although the tenor of the opinion would seem to support the latter interpretation," Greerhas since
been cited by the Court for the former proposition. 77 Thus, the extent to which the Court was influenced by the subject-matter character of the contested regulation remains unclear. What is clear is
that, whatever his rationale, Justice Stewart made no mention in
Greer either of Letter Carriers, Broadrick, and Buckley, in which
similar restrictions had been viewed as content neutral, or of Mosley
and Erznoznik, in which subject-matter restrictions had been
78
treated as content based.
5. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. Finally, Young v.
American Mini Theatres Inc., 7 also decided in 1976, once again
posed the problem of subject-matter restrictions relating to sex.
Young concerned the constitutionality of a series of Detroit zoning
ordinances that required motion picture theaters exhibiting nonobscene but sexually-explicit movies to be dispersed throughout the
city.8" The city had enacted the ordinances on the theory that the
location of several such theaters or other "regulated" businesses in
the same neighborhood leads ultimately to deterioration of the community. The Court, in a five-to-four decision, upheld the ordinances. Justice Stevens, speaking for four members of the Court,"'
recognized that the ordinances involved a clear content-based distinction, but nevertheless adopted a markedly lenient standard of
nonpublic forum into a public forum. Justice Stewart does not explain why such a conversion
took place in Lehman, where he joined the Brennan dissent, but not in Greer.
78 Justice Stewart noted repeatedly that the regulation was viewpoint neutral, see 424
U.S. at 838-39, and referred specifically to the subject-matter concept, see id. at 838 n.10.
Professor Tribe has adopted this interpretation of Greer. See L. TRINE, supra note 1, § 12-21,
at 691 n.21, 692.
17 See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 133-34 (1977).
71In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Powell, while invoking Letter Carriers,
treated the regulation as if it were content neutral, and strongly suggested a distinction
between subject-matter restrictions and other content-based restrictions. See 424 U.S. at 84344, 848 n.3. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, focused

primarily on the public forum issue. He indicated in passing, however, that the regulation
was also invalid because it embodied an impermissible regulation of content. See id. at 863,
867.
, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
0 The ordinances governed the location of any theater used to present "material distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing, or relating to
'Specified Sexual Activities' or 'Specified Anatomical Areas.'" Id. at 50.
81 Although Justice Powell joined some parts of the Stevens opinion, he did not join that
part involving the issues here under discussion.
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justification. "It is not our function," he declared, "to appraise the
wisdom of [the city's] decision to require adult theaters to be separated rather than concentrated in the same areas. 82 To the contrary, "the city's interest in attempting to preserve the quality of
life is one that must be accorded high respect," and it "must be
allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to
admittedly serious problems." Applying this standard, Justice
Stevens, not surprisingly, rejected the constitutional challenge. 4
Justice Stevens offered two justifications for this departure
from the stringent standards of review ordinarily used to test
content-based restrictions. First, he maintained that sexuallyexplicit movies, although not obscene, are nevertheless of relatively
"low" first amendment value,8 5 and therefore subject to reasonable
regulation. 6 This analysis did not command the support of a majority of the Court, and was forcefully repudiated by Justice Stewart
in dissent. 7 Second, and more to the point, Justice Stevens declared
that the essence of the rule prohibiting restrictions of speech "based
on the content of the protected communication is the need for absolute neutrality by the government; its regulation of communication
may not be affected by sympathy or hostility for the point of view
being expressed by the communicator." 8 Thus, the content-based
distinction in Young did not violate "the government's paramount
obligation of neutrality," for the challenged restriction of sexuallyexplicit movies "is unaffected by whatever social, political, or philosophical message a film may be intended to communicate; whether
a motion picture ridicules or characterizes one point of view or another, the effect of the ordinances is exactly the same." 9 According
to Justice Stevens, then, subject-matter restrictions, because they
are viewpoint neutral, are less troublesome than other forms of
12

427 U.S. at 71.

"Id.

" In upholding the ordinances, Justice Stevens emphasized (1) that there was a "factual

basis" for the city's conclusion that the restriction "will have the desired effect," id. at 71;
(2) that the ordinances did not have "the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access

to, lawful speech," id. at 71 n.35; and (3) that the harm against which the ordinances were
directed was only a "secondary effect" of the restricted speech, id. at 71 n.34.
m Justice Stevens maintained that since "few of us would march our sons or daughters
off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see" sexually explicit movies, "it is manifest that
society's interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and lesser,
magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate." Id. at 70. The question
whether any particular type of expression is of "low" first amendment value, and thus less
than fully protected, is beyond the scope of this article. See notes 7 & 15 supra.
" See id. at 70-71.
91See id. at 73 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 84-87 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 67.
n Id. at 70.
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content-based restrictions, and thus should be tested by less rigorous standards. Justice Stevens made no effort to explore this theory
in depth or to reconcile it with the Court's prior subject-matter
decisions.
Justice Powell, who cast the pivotal fifth vote to sustain the
ordinances, filed a separate concurring opinion. Arguing that Young
involved several unusual features making it "unique" and not analogous "to any . . . prior case," 90 Justice Powell concluded that the
ordinances were "an example of innovative land-use regulation,
implicating First Amendment concerns only incidentally and to a
limited extent.""1 In discussing the factors that influenced his perception of the case,92 Justice Powell did not mention that the case
involved a restriction based upon subject matter. Given the somewhat idiosyncratic nature of his analysis, it is difficult to ascertain
" Id. at 76 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell emphasized, for example, that (1) the
owners of the theaters had only a commercial and not a personally communicative interest
in exhibiting the movies, see id. at 78 & n.2; (2) the impact of the ordinances on the ability
of individuals to see such movies was only "incidental and minimal," id. at 78; and (3) the
city's intent was not "to restrict the communication itself because of its nature," id. at 81
n.4.
" Id. at 73. Justice Powell seems to have concluded that since "there is no indication"
that the ordinances would have "the effect of suppressing production of or, to any significant
degree, restricting access to adult movies," id. at 77, and since the real interests of the
exhibitors are commercial rather than communicative, see id. at 78 & n.2, "it is appropriate
to analyze" the case "under the four-part test of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968)." Id. at 79. Applying that test, he concluded that the ordinances were constitutional.
There are several problems with this analysis, and I should like to note them just briefly.
First, Justice Powell's insistence that the ordinances would not seriously impair the ability
of individuals to see these movies contrasts sharply with the long-standing principle that "one
is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the
plea that it may be exercised in some other place." Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163
(1939). Accord Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975). See also
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
757 n.15 (1976); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 & n.4 (1974). Second, even if one
accepts the initial steps in Justice Powell's reasoning, he never explains why he suddenly
shifts from ordinary content-based analysis to O'Brien.
Third, in applying the O'Brien test, Justice Powell reformulates the third and critical
requirement that "the governmental interest [be] unrelated to the suppression of free
speech." In his view, this requirement is satisfied so long as government does not have "an
intent or purpose to restrict the communication itself because of its nature." 427 U.S. at 81
n.4. This interpretation of O'Brien is, I believe, fundamentally incorrect. In my view, the
third requirement of O'Brien can never be satisfied when a law expressly draws a line based
upon content. Such laws are of necessity related "to the suppression of free speech." The real
purpose of this requirement, I submit, is to exclude from the O'Brien test those laws that do
not draw such a line, but that nevertheless should be treated as content-based because their
application is triggered by content or their passage was motivated by a hostility or.sympathy
for certain content. See Ely, supra note 1, at 1496-502. Finally, even if one accepts Justice
Powell's view of the third requirement of O'Brien, his conclusion that the city's motive was
pure is open to question. See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 71, at 203 n.47.
32 See note 90 supra.
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whether this factor also affected his conclusion and thus whether
Justice Stevens's remarks on the issue represented the views of a
majority of the Court.
Justice Stewart, writing for the four dissenters, saw Young as
involving an unexceptional attempt by government "to impose a
selective restraint on speech with a particular content.

9 3 He

made

no effort to answer Justice Stevens's argument that, because of their
apparent viewpoint neutrality, subject-matter distinctions should
be handled differently from other content-based restrictions. Moreover, Justice Stewart made no mention of his own three-month-old
opinion for the Court in Greer. Rather, referring to Mosley and
Erznoznik, he simply assumed that subject-matter restrictions were
no different from other content-based restrictions. 4 Tested against
the ordinary standards of content-based analysis, the ordinances,
although "well-intentioned," were clearly unconstitutional.' 5
As the foregoing discussion reveals, the Court has had considerable difficulty in its efforts to cope with restrictions that, although
content-based, are defined in terms of expression about an entire
subject rather than a particular viewpoint or idea. The Court's difficulty, I suspect, derives largely from its failure to see this class of
restrictions as presenting a separate and special problem of first
amendment interpretation. Indeed, the Court has for the most part
been virtually oblivious to the connections between its own subjectmatter decisions, often not even citing what seem in perspective to
be potentially significant, if not controlling, precedents. As a consequence, the Court has treated some of these restrictions as contentbased and others as content-neutral without in either case carefully
analyzing the problem.
The consequences of this state of affairs are several. First, from
the standpoint of craftsmanship, the Court's performance leaves
much to be desired: the language and the reasoning of the cases are
contradictory and imprecise. Second, it is at least possible that
several of these cases were "incorrectly" decided, in the sense that
had the Court been more thoughtful in its analysis and more aware
of the connections between its decisions it might have reached dif"427

U.S. at 84 n.2 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

See id. Justice Stewart explained Lehman and Rowan, not as subject-matter cases,
but as cases involving the "special" problem of captive auditors. See id. at 86 & n.5.
" Not surprisingly, the positions and arguments of the Justices in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 98 S.Ct. 3026 (1978), in which the Court upheld a restriction on profane speech,
were quite similar to those in Young. This is so in part because, although a limitation on the
use of profanity is not technically a subject-matter restriction, it nevertheless has many of
the same attributes, including the apparent viewpoint neutrality that was so important to
Justice Stevens in Young.
"
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ferent results. And third, to the extent that the Court was moved
in any given case to uphold a restriction because it was defined in
terms of subject matter, but failed to isolate this factor as critical,
it might have generated a doctrine or principle that could later be
used to uphold other sorts of content-based restrictions as well." My
purpose, however, is not merely to catalogue the Court's failings,
but also to offer an alternative approach to the problem. Such a task
requires a closer examination of subject-matter restrictions and prevailing first amendment doctrine.
TI.

A FRAMEWORK

FOR ANALYSIS OF SUBJECT-MATTER REsTRICTIONS

How, then, should subject-matter restrictions be analyzed? Are
they indistinguishable in essence from other forms of content-based
restrictions and thus properly subject to the ordinarily stringent
standards of content-based analysis? Are they, rather, a wholly separate form of content-based restriction, more akin in essence to
content-neutral restrictions, and thus properly subject to contentneutral balancing? Or are they in some intermediate position, possessing qualities of both content-neutral and content-based restrictions, and thus properly subject to a-more variable sort of analysis?
Since the content-based/content-neutral distinction seems to lie at
the heart of the problem, any attempt to answer these questions
should at least begin with an inquiry into the reasons underlying the
doctrine that content-based restrictions are generally more threatening to our system of free expression than content-neutral restrictions and must therefore be tested against markedly more rigorous
standards of justification. Once we identify the reasons for this doctrine, we can attempt to determine the extent to which subjectmatter restrictions engender similar sorts of concerns.
A. The Special Dangers of Content-Based Restrictions
Although there has been much discussion of the purposes underlying the guarantee of free speech,97 surprisingly scant attention
has been paid to the related question why, within the realm of
possible abridgments of free expression, we are so especially wary
of restrictions based upon content." On the rare occasion when the
" This danger is perhaps most evident in the Court's use of the captive audience concept
in Lehman and Rowan.
" See, e.g., T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-9 (1970); L. TRIBE,
supra note 1, § § 12-1 to -4, at 576-89; Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory,

1977 Am.B.
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J. 521; Karst, supra note 5, at 23-26.

,sThe values underlying protection of free expression are often threatened by contentneutral as well ds by content-based restrictions of speech. Our concern here is with the reasons
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question does come up, the answer is all too often simply taken for
granted." The question is important, however, if subject-matter
restrictions are to be placed within their proper first amendment
context.
1. Marketplace of Ideas. There appear to be two primary reasons for the Court's strikingly speech-protective approach to
content-based restrictions. First, because such restrictions accord
differential treatment to speech because of its content, they necessarily distort the ordinary workings of the "marketplace of ideas"
in a content-differential manner. Such restrictions thus leave the
public with only an incomplete-and perhaps inaccurate-perception of their social and political universe. As a consequence, they tend seriously to undermine two of the principal purposes of free speech: they distort the search for truth,'0 and they
distort the process, so essential to the effective operation of a selfgoverning society, by which the citizen makes for himself critical
decisions on matters of public policy. 10 1
Whether a concern for preserving the "marketplace of ideas"
can fairly be said to justify special treatment of content-based restrictions depends, of course, upon whether these distortions are in
some sense peculiar to content-based restrictions. Content-neutral
restrictions may also limit the public's access to potentially relevant
information and ideas. 2 But because they appear on their face to
do so in a content-neutral manner, there is arguably a prima facie
case that such restrictions do not have a similarly distorting effect
why content-based restrictions might be especially threatening to those underlying values.
" See, e.g., L. TmE, supra note 1, § 12-2, at 581.
i The idea that a fundamental purpose of free speech is to aid in society's search for
truth was first developed by Milton. See J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644), reprintedin AREOPAGrrICA AND OTHER PROSE WORKS 1, 23-38 (1972). See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 339-40 (1974); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859), reprintedin THE PmLsoPHY OF JOHN STuART MILL 20708 (M. Cohen ed. 1961).
1*1The leading exponent of the view that the free speech guarantee is designed to facilitate intelligent self-government in a democratic system is Alexander Meiklejohn. See A.
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GovERNMENT (1948); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT.

Rav. 245 (1961). See also T. EMERSON, supra note 93, at 7; Bork, NeutralPrinciplesand Some
FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Kalven, The New York Times Case:A Note
on the "Central Meaning of the FirstAmendment," 1964 SuP. CT. Rxv. 191.
'" Although content-neutral restrictions exist in several forms, most directly limit the
time, place, or manner of communicative activity. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104 (1972); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). Other facially content-neutral regulations
may have only an incidental-but nevertheless important-limiting effect on communicaton.
See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449 (1958).
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and thus do not as seriously inhibit the search for truth or the
process of self-governance.' 0 3 This is not to say, however, that
content-neutral restrictions can never have a content-differential
impact. To the contrary, in at least some instances such restrictions,
although content-neutral on their face, may nevertheless be selectively enforced in a content-differential manner. But to meet this
concern by testing all content-neutral restrictions under the same
stringent standards of review employed to test content-based restrictions'0 ' seems more drastic a step than first amendment principles require. Thus, in its own effort to reduce the risk of selective
enforcement of content-neutral restrictions, the Court has relied
instead upon its vagueness and overbreadth doctrines that, by requiring even content-neutral restrictions to be narrowly drawn and
carefully drafted, sharply limit the opportunities for such abuse." 5
Moreover, when actually confronted with a clear case of selective
enforcement, the Court has not hesitated to treat facially contentneutral restrictions as if they were in fact content-based. '
Content-neutral restrictions may also distort the marketplace
of ideas in a content-differential manner when, although neutral on
their face, they have de facto "unequal effects on various types of
messages."'0 ° For example, a law prohibiting all leafletting appears
content-neutral, but may in fact have a disproportionately harsh
impact upon those who, for reasons of finances or ideology, do not
have ready access to more conventional means of communication.'
Similarly, an apparently even-handed disclosure requirement may
in fact fall more heavily upon those with controversial or unpopular
views.0 9 Indeed, most content-neutral restrictions have at least
10 Even content-neutral restrictions that have no content-differential impact require
careful analysis, for an effective system of free expression presupposes not only the absence
of content censorship, but also the existence of a meaningful opportunity for the individual
to communicate his views to the relevant audience. See, e.g., CBS v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 193-94 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) and cases cited therein; Scanlon,
A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AIF. 204, 223 (1972); Stone, supra
note 11, at 233-34, 245.
I" A high standard of justification would reduce the risk of selective enforcement of
content-neutral restrictions because, if the harm caused by the communicative activity is

truly substantial, underenforcement becomes far more costly to society.
11 See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 41 n.48
(1976); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
See also Karst, supra note 5, at 30, 38-39.
'" See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
° Karst, supra note 5, at 36.
' See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943). See also Kalven, supra
note 30, at 30.
I" See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60
(1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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some de facto content-differential effects. And although these effects are in most instances more remote and less direct than when
the restriction is explicitly content-based, it might nevertheless
seem appropriate, if we are seriously dedicated to minimizing
content-differential distortions of the "marketplace," to employ
content-based standards of review in all cases. The Court has attempted to handle this problem in a more moderate manner, however, taking this factor into account in the balancing process only
when the particular content-neutral restriction at issue is likely to
have substantial and relatively clear-cut content-differential effects.110 Viewed in this light, the desire to prevent contentdifferential distortions of the "marketplace of ideas" seems to provide a partial explanation-but only a partial explanation-of the
Court's special treatment of content-based restrictions.
2.

Government Impartiality.The second possible explanation

of the Court's strikingly speech-protective approach to contentbased restrictions derives from the precept that it is per se impermissible for government to restrict speech because it disapproves of
the message conveyed."' This precept is, indeed, a fundamental of
first amendment jurisprudence, for any effort by the government to
suppress speech because it does not like the ideas or information
expressed would seem flatly to contradict three of the most important principles of free speech theory. The most familiar premise is,
of course, that the system of free expression serves to promote the
discovery of truth-political and otherwise. This view rests upon the
assumption that, in the search for "truth," we are more likely to
succeed in the long run if we rely, not upon the dictate of a government censor but, rather, upon "the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market.""' Any effort of government to restrict speech because it consists of a "false," "wrong," or
- See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30-35, 60-84 (1976); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). See also L. TRE, supra note 1, § 12-20, at 683; Karst,
supra note 5, at 36-42. But see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Even when the
Court does take the presence of a content-differential impact into account in its contentneutral balancing, it does not shift automatically to full content-based standards of review.
M See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 n.31 (1978); Linmark Assocs.,
Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977); L. TRmE, supra note 1, § 12-5, at
591; Bogen, The Supreme -Court'sInterpretationof the Guarantee of Freedom of Speech,
35 MD. L. REv. 555, 557 (1976); Scanlon, supra note 103; cf. United States v. O'Brien, 381
U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (government regulatory interest must be unrelated to the suppression
of freedom of expression).
112Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also
note 100 supra.
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"bad" idea directly contravenes this basic first amendment presupposition.
A second principle flows from the observation that the free
speech guarantee was designed, in part, to enable intelligent selfgovernment in a democratic system."' As the Court has recently
observed, "the people in our democracy are entrusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments," and "if there be any danger that the people
cannot evaluate the information and arguments advanced [in the
course of public debate], it is a danger contemplated by the Framers of the First Amendment."" 4 Any attempt by government to
squelch "undesirable" ideas or information necessarily usurps the
right of the people to make such decisions for themselves and thus
conflicts with this central premise of the free speech guarantee.
Finally, it has long been recognized that the system of free
expression, by enabling the individual to make political, social,
moral, and other decisions for himself, serves in a critical way to
enhance personal growth, self-realization, and the development of
individual autonomy." 5 Any government effort to suppress speech
because the government does not agree with the idea communicated
and does not trust the individual to decide "wisely" is patently
inconsistent with this underlying purpose of the first amendment.
In light of the foregoing, there would seem to be ample support
for the precept that it is per se illegitimate for the government to
restrict speech merely because it disapproves of the message conveyed." ' What, though, does this have to do with the Court's special
treatment of content-based restrictions? Although such restrictions
may in some instances derive, at ,least in part, from government
11 See note 97 supra.
' First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 (1978).
", See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); T. EMERSON, supra note 97, at 6; L. TnmE, supra
note 1, § 12-1, at 578; Scanlon, supra note 103.
'M It is in some sense difficult to speak meaningfully of a distinction between government
disapproval of an idea and government disapproval of the consequences that might follow
from the dissemination of the idea. That is, when one does not "like" an idea, it is as often
as not because one does not like what would happen if people agreed with it. As a result, it
might be said that the precept here under discussion is, in fact, meaningless. The answer, I
think, is to recognize that the precept is directed not only at government efforts to restrict
speech because it is "wrong," but also at government efforts to restrict speech in order to
prevent one specific type of "bad" consequence in particular-that is, that the speech might
persuade people to act in an "Undesirable" manner. Understood in this manner, the precept
makes considerable sense. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,791 n.31 (1978);
Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977); Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). See also
Scanlon, supra note 103.
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hostility to the views suppressed, in others that factor may not have
played a role at all. The problem, of course, is to separate one set
of cases from the other. One approach might be simply to uphold
any content-based restriction that serves a legitimate government
interest. Such a standard would guarantee that there is at least
some legitimate justification for the restriction. It would not, however, exclude the possibility that the real reason for the restriction
was disapproval of the ideas suppressed. Since government can
posit some legitimate purpose for virtually any content-based restriction, this standard would routinely permit pretextual evasions
of the precept. Moreover, even if one were satisfied in any given case
that the particular restriction was genuinely intended to serve the
interest asserted, the possibility would nevertheless remain that the
decision to adopt the restriction was in some degree coloredconsciously or unconsciously-by the illegitimate consideration.
Indeed, this possibility seems very real in many cases, and any
relatively lenient standard of review would fail to meet the danger
squarely."1 7
A second possible approach to the application of the precept is
to attempt to ascertain in each case whether governmental opposition to the speech in fact played any appreciable role in the decision
to enact the particular content-based restriction at issue. For a variety of reasons, however, the Court has generally avoided the cumbersome process of inquiring into legislative motivation." 8 Whatever
the merits of that decision in other contexts,"' it seems especially
compelling here. Typically, the question whether an inquiry into
legislative motivation is appropriate arises when, in looking at the
challenged legislation only on its face, one would ordinarily assume
that there was no improper motivation, but some special circumstance or some unique contextual twist nevertheless gives rise to a
suspicion that the legislation was indeed motivated by some improper consideration. 2 ' The scrutiny of content-neutral restrictions
would ordinarily follow this pattern. With respect to content-based
"I In several instances the Court has upheld, under a relatively lenient standard of first

amendment review, content-based restrictions that purport to serve some asserted state
interest, but that seem on closer inslection to have been designed at least partly to suppress
"undesirable ideas." See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New

York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920); Debs v. United States,
249 U.S. 211 (1919).
"I' See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 382-85 (1968). But see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
"' For discussions of the merits of this view, see L. TIM, supra note 1, §§ 12-5 to -6;
Brest, supra note 3; Ely, supra note 3.
"

See, e.g., cases cited in note 118 supra.
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restrictions, however, this pattern is reversed, for anyone with any
knowledge of human nature should naturally assume that the decision to adopt almost any content-based restriction might have been
affected by an antipathy on the part of at least some legislators to
the ideas or information being suppressed.' 21 The logical assumption, in other words, is not that there is no improper motivation but,
rather, because legislators are only human, that there is a substantial risk that an impermissible consideration has in fact colored the
deliberative process. Thus, if the motivation behind the enactment
of content-based restrictions were routinely open to question, the
issue would be raised in virtually every instance. It would then be
incumbent upon the courts to attempt in each case to ascertain the
actual degree of improper motivation and to decide whether it vitiated the content-based restriction at issue. Such an approach
seems neither sensible nor economical.
To avoid the necessity of such an inquiry in every case, one
might resort to the use of presumptions. Thus, a third approach to
implementing the precept would be to erect a presumption that
content-based restrictions, because of their very nature, are tainted
by at least the likelihood of improper motivation. This presumption
might even be deemed irrebuttable, thus rendering all contentbased restrictions per se invalid. Such a presumption seems too
harsh, though, for at least two reasons. First, there might be some
content-based restrictions that were in fact untainted by any appreciable improper motivation. In such cases, one might permit the
government to counter the presumption with proof of motivational
purity. As already indicated, however, the Court has generally
sought to avoid such inquiries. Moreover, in such a case the government would be attempting to prove a negative, thus exacerbating
all the problems usually associated with inquiry into legislative
motive.' 22 Second, whether or not we permit proof of motivational
purity to overcome the presumption, there may be some cases in
which we can be reasonably certain that the content-based restriction would have been enacted even in the absence of any improper
121 Cf. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (suggesting that those who are certain of their power will logically attempt to suppress the
expression of opposing points of view). Legislators will almost invariably have their own
opinions about the merits of the speech suppressed by any particular content-based restriction, and however much they may try, it seems doubtful that they can wholly ignore those
opinions when considering the desirability of the restriction.
12 The difficulties involved in such an exercise are well demonstrated by Justice Powell's
rather questionable "finding" of no improper motivation in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 80-82 & n.4 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
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motivation.12 3 In such circumstances, we might conclude that the
precept was not violated, or at least not violated in any significant
sense, and that the restriction should thus not be set aside. This
might be so, for example, when the interest served by the restriction
is truly compelling and when there is no other way to protect this
interest than by use of the content-based restriction. This mode of
analysis, of course, resembles in important respects the stringent
standards of review used by the Court to test content-based restrictions, and viewed in this light, the Court's special treatment of such
restrictions may sensibly be understood as an attempt to effectuate
the precept that it is per se illegitimate for government to restrict
24
speech because it disfavors the message conveyed.'
Thus, although at first glance it seems self-evident that
content-based restrictions are more threatening to the system of free
expression than content-neutral restrictions, this proposition is, on
closer examination, somewhat more difficult to defend than might
be expected. Indeed, since content-neutral, like content-based restrictions may at times have a differential impact or reflect a latent
government hostility toward certain ideas, the differences between
these two types of restrictions often seem to be differences more of
degree than of kind. Nevertheless, the Court's special treatment of
content-based restrictions can be explained, at least generally, in
terms of the uniquely distorting impact they have upon the
"marketplace of ideas" and the particularly high likelihood that
their passage may have been tainted by the presence of a fundamentally illegitimate motive. Although neither of these considerations,
standing alone, may be sufficient to explain fully the Court's approach,12 5 taken together they shed considerable light upon the
Court's interpretation of the first amendment and provide a basis
for analyzing restrictions defined in terms of subject matter.
I2

Cf. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (burden on school

district to show it would have reached same decision to fire teacher even in the absence of
protected speech).
M2,
See Bogen, supra note 111. As already indicated, content-neutral restrictions, precisely because they are content-neutral, do not generally involve a similar likelihood of improper motivation. Accordingly, they need not be tested against equally stringent standards of

review. At the same time, however, the Court's refusal to inquire into possible improper
motivation in this context, see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), is problematic.
See generally note 119 supra.
I' For example, a content-based distinction that has no appreciable effect on the
"marketplace of ideas" might nevertheless be invalid because of the possibility that it was
motivated by impermissible considerations. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427
U.S. 50, 76-82 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
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B. Principles of Adjudication for Subject-Matter Restrictions
In attempting to decide how best to deal with the problem of
subject-matter restrictions, a central concern is whether they pose
a substantially less serious threat to the system of free expression
than the more familiar forms of content-based restrictions. If so, it
may be that like content-neutral restrictions they need not be subjected to the rigorous standards of justification ordinarily employed
to test content-based restrictions.
At least a plausible case can be made for less stringent treatment. As indicated earlier, the Court's rigorous approach to
content-based restrictions stems in part from the realization that
such restrictions have an especially potent content-differential impact upon the "marketplace of ideas." This distortion of the
"marketplace" is of concern because it may result in the
"mutilation of the thinking process of the community, 12 thus impairing effective self-governance and the search for "truth."
Subject-matter restrictions also distort the "marketplace of ideas"
in a content-differential manner. But because they are at least facially viewpoint-neutral, the potential harm in this regard is somewhat more remote. Although not without difficulties, viewpointneutral restrictions directed against all speech relating to an entire
subject do not have the same sort of skewing effect on "the thinking
process of the community" as restrictions directed specifically
against speech taking a particular side in an ongoing debate. Moreover, because of their apparent viewpoint-neutrality, subject-matter
restrictions seem much less likely than other forms of content-based
restrictions to be the product of governmental hostility to the ideas
or information suppressed. In general, one is more likely to be hostile to speech espousing a specific point of view than to speech about
an entire subject. As a result, one might, with some force, argue that
subject-matter restrictions are in general less threatening than other
sorts of content-based restrictions and, like content-neutral restrictions, need not be subjected to the most stringent standards of
review.
Although this argument has a certain surface appeal, it fails to
recognize that the Court, particularly in recent years, has been reluctant to embrace broad new exceptions to its ordinarily rigorous
approach to content-based restrictions. 2 7 The concern, of course, is
,21
A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1960).

See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (the corporate identity of
speaker does not deprive otherwise protected speech of its protection); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial
"1
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that once one accepts such erosion, the slope is slippery indeed. If
subject-matter restrictions are exempt from ordinary content-based
analysis because of their apparent viewpoint neutrality, what about
other arguably viewpoint-neutral restrictions?' 28 Should the door be
opened to an inquiry in each case as to whether the particular
content-based restriction at issue is in fact viewpoint-neutral? As is
often the case when dealing with a right as sensitive to limitation
as free expression, adequate protection can be assured only by deliberate overprotection. It may well be, then, that the better part of
wisdom in this context is to leave the door shut completely. But if
any exemption at all is allowed, it should be only after the most
searching scrutiny of the risks involved.
To aid in understanding those risks here, it may be helpful to
divide subject-matter restrictions into two categories. The first comprises subject-matter restrictions defined in terms of speech about
a specific issue or, perhaps, about a relatively narrow cluster of
issues. The Mosley ordinance, with its special focus on labor speech,
is an example. 29' Other examples include laws prohibiting corporations from expressing publicly their views on issues concerning taxation of individuals, 3 ' forbidding teachers to discuss publicly matters
subject to collective bargaining, 3 ' or banning street demonstrations
concerning the propriety of the Vietnam war. Like all subjectmatter restrictions, these relatively circumscribed restrictions apspeech protected by first amendment); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (profanity
protected by first amendment); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (hyperbolic
threat protected by first amendment). See also FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S.Ct. 3026
(1978) (Court declined to exempt profanity from ordinary content-based analysis); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (Court declined to exempt sexually explicit
speech from ordinary content-based analysis).
1' Claims of viewpoint neutrality might be made, for example, with respect to restrictions on the use of profanity, see FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 3028 n.22 (1978)
(Stevens, J.), gag orders designed to protect criminal defendants, restrictions on the press in
order to redress "invasions of privacy," and the law of defamation, see L. TRINE, supra note
1, § 12-13, at 641.
I" The restriction in Mosley represents a special case. On its face it is the broadest of
the restrictions considered in the decisions, banning all speech except labor speech. It thus
closely resembles a content-neutral restriction. At the same time, the very breadth of the
restriction, when coupled with the narrow exception, means that the restriction singles out
one particular kind of speech for favorable treatment. It is, however, no more legitimate for
the government to favor certain ideas in this manner than to disfavor them. That such a
restriction bans other opinions in addition to those in direct competition with the favored
speech hardly reduces the threat of prejudice to the marketplace of ideas or the danger of
government partiality. A law banning all speech except that by Democrats is no better-indeed is probably worse-than one banning all speech by Republicans. The basic principles should be no different in one case from what they would'be in the other.
' See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
'
See City of Madison, Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
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pear on their face to be viewpoint-neutral. In practice, however,
these restrictions will often disadvantage one "side" of an issue
more than the other, depending upon which "side" is more likely
to be affected by the restriction. In the street demonstration example, for instance, the restriction, although viewpoint-neutral on its
face, would in fact have had a more severe impact upon critics of
the Vietnam war than upon its supporters, for critics relied more
heavily upon this mode of communication. Similarly, in the taxation and collective bargaining cases, the Court itself has recognized
in passing that these seemingly viewpoint-neutral restrictions may
have viewpoint-differential effects.132 The question, then, is whether
the de facto, viewpoint-differential impact these sorts of restrictions
often have poses a significant enough danger to offset their facial
viewpoint neutrality, which suggests that they should, like contentneutral restrictions, be exempt from the ordinarily stringent standards of content-based analysis.
At the outset, it should be recalled that many content-neutral
restrictions will also have precisely this sort of de facto effect. 33 For
example, a content-neutral law banning all street demonstrations
will have exactly the same viewpoint-differential impact on the war
issue as a more limited subject-matter restriction directed specifically against speech about the war. As noted earlier, however, the
mere existence of this sort of de facto impact usually will not trigger
full content-based analysis, although the Court will weigh this factor in testing the constitutionality of content-neutral restrictions.
It may be, then, that a similar approach should govern our analysis
of these narrowly defined subject-matter restrictions.
There is, however, a potentially critical difference between
content-neutral restrictions and the type of subject-matter restriction under discussion here. Whereas narrowly defined subjectmatter restrictions will have a viewpoint-differential impact upon
only a single issue or, at most, a relatively narrow class of issues,
content-neutral restrictions will often have such an impact upon a
broad range of largely unrelated issues. In the street demonstration
context, for example, the content-neutral restriction may have a de
facto viewpoint-differential impact, not only upon the war issue, but
also upon such diverse issues as abortion, the rights of Nazis, homosexuality, nuclear energy and the equal rights amendment. Although this result may seem to make content-neutral restrictions
more problematic, in fact the opposite may be true. The very perva,32See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-86 (1978); City of Madison, Joint
School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175-76 (1976).
'" See text at notes 107-110 supra.
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siveness of the distorting impact of such restrictions significantly
reduces the risk that they were actually adopted in an effort to
disadvantage any particular viewpoint. The more diffuse the impact, the greater the probability that the restriction serves a governmental purpose unrelated to the suppression of disfavored ideas.'34
With respect to narrowly defined subject-matter restrictions, however, the viewpoint-differential effect is sharply limited in scope,
thus increasing the risk of improper legislative motivation.
Accordingly, whereas content-neutral restrictions ordinarily
threaten only the first amendment concern for preserving the marketplace of ideas, and then only indirectly, narrowly defined
subject-matter restrictions having a clear viewpoint-differential
impact seem to implicate directly both of the concerns underlying
the Court's special treatment of content-based restrictions.'35 The
only remaining question, then, is whether all narrowly defined
subject-matter restrictions should be tested by standards of
content-based analysis or, rather, whether such standards should
apply only when there is a demonstrable viewpoint-differential effect. The point is arguable, but the former approach seems preferable. Given the relatively high likelihood of a viewpoint-differential
effect when the restriction is narrowly drawn, the application of
strict standards in such cases, rather than an attempt to treat the
issue on a case-by-case basis, seems most consistent with the general presumption in favor of clarity and ease of administration in the
first amendment area.
The value of this approach is especially apparent with respect
to restrictions limiting expression because of its concern with sex.
Indeed, it is particularly misleading to argue, as did Justice Stevens
in Young, that such restrictions should be examined with deference
because they apply without regard to the "social, political, or philosophical message [the speech is] intended to communicate.""'3 As
a practical matter, the speech suppressed by restrictions such as
those involved in Rowan, Erznoznik, and Young will almost invariably carry an implicit, if not explicit, message in favor of more re01

See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J.,

concurring); Kalven, supra note 30, at 30; Karst, supra note 5, at 67.
1" This analysis indicates that, at least in this context, a differential impact alone is not
sufficient to trigger full content-based analysis. The Court's treatment of content-neutral
restrictions is generally consistent with this conclusion. This treatment suggests that the
differential-impact concern is at least arguably subordinate to the improper motivation concern. I should note, too, that the analysis in the text seems consistent with the Court's
tendency, in testing the constitutionality of content-neutral restrictions, to give added
weight to the viewpoint-differential impact as the specificity of the impact increases. See
cases cited in notes 109-110 supra.
131Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. at 70.
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laxed sexual mores. Such restrictions, in other words, have a potent
viewpoint-differential impact. In a more subtle sense, moreover, the
form and content of this sort of expression are inseparable. In our
society, the very presence of sexual explicitness in speech seems
ideologically significant, without regard to whatever other messages
might be intended. To treat such restrictions as viewpoint-neutral
seems simply to ignore reality. Finally, in terms of the improper
motivation question, a large percentage of citizens apparently feel
threatened by nonobscene, sexually-explicit speech and believe it to
be morally reprehensible. If it were not for the Court's relatively
narrow construction of the obscenity concept, much of this speech
would undoubtedly be banned outright. Thus, any restriction along
these lines will carry an extraordinarily high risk that its enactment
was tainted by this fundamentally illegitimate consideration. Such
restrictions, although superficially viewpoint-neutral, pose a
uniquely compelling case for content-based scrutiny.
The second category of subject-matter restrictions consists of
those subject-matter restrictions that are directed against broad
classes of speech, cutting across a wide spectrum of issues. Restric.tions such as those in CBS and Lehman, disfavoring all noncommercial, public-issue speech, and those in Buckley, Greer, Broadrick,
and Letter Carriers, disfavoring all partisan political speech, are
illustrative.' 3 7 Unlike the class of narrowly defined restrictions, such
statutes possess what may be the most important attribute of
content-neutral restrictions. That is, although such a statute may
at times have de facto, viewpoint-differential effects, those effects
are likely to be spread over a fairly wide range of issues, thus mitigating the risk that the restriction is tainted by an improper legislative motivation directed against a particular vipwpoint. For example, although a ban on any partisan political speech on a military
base may tend to disadvantage those candidates who rely more
heavily upon this sort of nonmedia communication,'1 that effect
exists without regard to whether the candidate is a liberal or libertarian, a Socialist or Nazi. Moreover, a content-neutral ban on all
speeches on the base would have the exact same de facto, viewpoint-differential impact. These same observations hold true not
only with respect to Greer, but also with respect to Buckley,
Broadrick, Letter Carriers, and, I suspect, almost any restriction
,37There is, of course, some ambiguity in the distinction between narrowly and broadly
defined restrictions. As a practical matter, however, the latter category is likely to consist
almost exclusively of the restrictions identified in the text as broadly defined.
I' See Spock v. David, 502 F.2d 953, 956 (3d Cir. 1974); Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047,
1056 (3d Cir. 1972).
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on partisan political speech. The point, of course, is not that these
possible viewpoint-differential effects are unimportant. To the
contrary, even in the context of content-neutral restrictions, they
can result in invalidation of the legislation.' 5 The point is rather
that this type of subject-matter restriction poses problems virtually
indistinguishable from those posed by content-neutral restrictions.
Subject-matter restrictions directed against all noncommercial, public issue speech are somewhat more problematic. Typically,
a content-neutral restriction will have a differential impact because
it deprives all speakers of a resource or communicative opportunity
that is more valuable to some speakers than to others. Although
restrictions directed against partisan political speech also follow
this pattern, the differential impact of restrictions directed against
noncommercial, public-issue speech has an additional component.
For example, the exclusion of public-issue advertisements from the
vehicles in Lehman had a de facto, viewpoint-differential impact
identical to that which a content-neutral exclusion would produce.
But, since commercial advertisements frequently carry implicit political messages, some viewpoints on some public issues will effectively be communicated despite the seemingly viewpoint-neutral
ban, 4 0 thereby producing an additional level of sub rosa, viewpointdifferential effects. The basic nature of those effects, however, is
unchanged-they still occur over a wide range of issues, thus reducing the likelihood that the restriction may actually have been aimed
at particular viewpoints. Although ultimately only a matter of degree, the similarity to content-neutral restrictions seems to remain
dominant.'
It may be then, that subject-matter restrictions falling within
the second category should be tested by content-neutral balancing
See authorities cited in notes 109-110 supra.
In a situation similar to that in Lehman, the California Supreme Court offered several
examples of the differential impact such restrictions may have:
A cigarette company is permitted to advertise the desirability of smoking its brand,
but a cancer society is not entitled to caution by advertisements that cigarette smoking
is injurious to health. A theater may advertise a motion picture that portrays sex and
violence, but the Legion for Decency has no right to post a message calling for clean
films. A lumber company may advertise its wood products, but a conservation group
cannot implore citizens to write to the President or Governor about protecting our
natural resources. An oil refinery may advertise its products, but a citizens organization
cannot demand enforcement of existing air pollution statutes. An insurance company
may announce its available policies, but a senior citizens' club cannot plead for legislation to improve our social security program.
Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 51, 57-58, 434 P.2d 982, 986-87, 64
Cal. Rptr. 430, 434-35 (1967).
M This evaluation represents a possible step back from a position I took several years
ago. See Stone, supra note 11, at 277-78.
"'
'"
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rather than by the more rigorous standards of content-based review.
Even if such an approach is accepted, though, the fact that the
restriction at issue is defined in terms of subject matter, and is not
in fact content-neutral, should nevertheless play a central role in the
analysis. That is, the state must explain not only why it restricted
the speech it restricted, but also why it failed to restrict the speech
it exempted from the restriction. It must, in other words, justify the
content-based distinction. Such justification is necessary, not so
much because the distinction may pose a ,4hreat to the interests
underlying the special treatment of content-based restrictions, but
rather because the very existence of the content-based distinction
tends to undercut the state's showing, required even in the context
of content-neutral balancing, that the restriction
is designed to
42
serve some substantial governmental purpose.
The degree to which this problem exists varies considerably
from case to case. In Lehman, for example, the city attempted to
justify its prohibition on the display of public issue advertisements
on the ground that the prohibition was necessary to protect captive
commuters from unwanted exposure to unpleasant messages. This
argument loses much of its force, however, when one recognizes
that, as a class, "[c]ommercial advertisements may be as offensive
and intrusive to captive audiences as any political message."'4 The
apparent underinclusiveness of the restriction would thus seem
largely to undermine the state's claim that the prohibition of public
issue speech can be justified by reference to the interest asserted.
At the other extreme are restrictions defined in terms of subject
matter that seem to pose few, if any, problems of underinclusiveness. In Broadrick, Letter Carriers,and Buckley, for example,
the concerns underlying the challenged restrictions seem to derive
almost exclusively from partisan political speech. Finally, cases
such as CBS and Greer seem to occupy the middle ground between
these extremes.
The difficulties in this analysis may suggest that the most prudent course is simply to test all subject-matter restrictions by the
ordinarily stringent standards of content-based analysis. Clarity
and simplicity are important values in first amendment jurisprudence, and acceptance of even a narrow' sacrifice of those values in
this context might have unwelcome, long-range consequences. Yet,
"' The degree of scrutiny involved in this inquiry varies with the circumstances. See
authorities cited in note 2 supra. For the reasons for requiring such a showing, see note 103
supra.
"' Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. at 308 (Douglas, J., concurring); see id.
at 319; Stone, supra note 11, at 279.
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as evidenced by its decisions, the Court is inclined to view restrictions falling within the second category with some lenity, and there
is a reasonjably sound analytical basis for that view. Indeed, whatever other objections are lodged against them, it would be a bit
jarring to learn that the statutes in Buckley, Broadrick, and Letter
Carriershad been held unconstitutional under the first amendment
because they were limited in application to only partisan political
speech.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has failed to recognize subject-matter restrictions as a separate class of restraints on speech. As a consequence, the Court has in some cases treated the subject-matter
restriction as if it were indistinguishable from other sorts of contentbased restrictions, while in others it has effectively disregarded the
subject-matter restriction entirely and thus analyzed the challenged
legislation or regulation as if it were content-neutral. Moreover,
apart from a few rather obvious and seemingly casual observations,
the Court has made little effort to place the problem in its proper
first amendment context or to analyze it in any real depth.
Although the differences between content-based and contentneutral restrictions are more elusive than might be expected, and
are often only differences of degree, such differences do exist, and
the Court's exacting scrutiny of content-based restrictions can be
explained and justified. Subject-matter restrictions pose a particularly intriguing and useful puzzle, for they seem to exist in a middle
world, sharing some characteristics with both of the more common
forms of restrictions. It is largely for this reason that the Court has
had so much difficulty in its efforts to come to grips with the
subject-matter puzzle. The analysis offered here is intended at least
to point us in the right direction.

